What is wrong with Davidson's Anomalous Monoism? - Dr. R.C. Pradhan

     This paper seeks to examine Davidson’s theory of anomalous monism in his philosophy of mind.  This theory is famously known for its denial of psychophysical laws relating the mental with the physical.  This has justly become the subject-matter of an intense debate1 in recent philosophy of mind It has increasingly been felt that Davidson has defended the autonomy of the mental without making sufficient room for mind in the world of nature. It is alleged that for him the mental is causally inefficacious or inert2 so that there is nothing that can make mind autonomous.
     The aim of this paper is to defend Davidson’s autonomy thesis even if such a defence may entail rejecting his thesis of identity of the mental with the physical.  My contention is that mind is autonomous in an ontological sense for which we have to provide a more non-reductivist framework than is available in Davidson’s theory.


I.  The Mental is the Physical: Davidson’s Monistic Frame                                                      


     There is a definite monistic metaphysics unmistakably present in Davidson’s philosophy of mind. It is manifested in his ontological thesis that the mental is the physical, i.e. mind is ultimately non-different from the physical system in which it is embedded.  The picture of the world thus presented contains mental events which are ontologically the same as the physical events.
     In this picture of the world the mental events are not abolished altogether but are introduced in the mechanism of the description of the mental.  The mental therefore has its locus in the descriptive system of beliefs, intentions, etc. which is differentiated from the descriptive system of the physical. Thus at the ontological level the mental events are the same as the physical events though they differ in their respective vocabularies.  Thus here is a mixed picture of the world allowing for a physicalist or minimal materialist3 ontology along with a conceptual dualism making room for a full-fledged system of the mental.
     The following theses broadly characterize Davidson’s philosophy of mind:       
D1: There is token-identity of the mental with the physical.  That is, a particular mental event,  in spite of its descriptional differences,  is the same as the physical event with which it is correlated.
D2: The mental is causally supervenient on the physical such that the mental                                                             characteristics are depend on the physical characteristics.
D3: The mental is irreducible to the physical and thus is autonomous.  It is free of  the deterministic laws of the physical.
     While D1 and D2 define Davidson’s monistic metaphysics of the world, D3 ushers in the anomaly of the mental in relation to the physical.  Davidson’s philosophy of mind is thus justly called anomalous monism4.
     There are three basic principles5 P1-P3 which function as the basic postulates or premises of Davidson’s anomalous monism.  They are as follows:
P1: Mental events cause physical events and vice-versa as they are in some sort of a  causal interaction (The Principle of Causal Interaction).
P2: The physical events are nomologically closed, that is, they are strictly determined by  causal laws (The Principle of Nomological Causation).
P3: There are no psychophysical laws relating the mental to the physical (The Principle of  the Anomalism of the Mental).
     P1-P3 lay down  the basic presuppositions of the theory of anomalous monism as a theory of mind. According to this theory, mind and the world make the reality without the mind being ontologically different from the physical world, and yet there is the mind in relation to the world.  The mind-talk is as fundamental as the brain-talk and so there is a dimension of the mind that cannot be part of the physical system.
     Davidson’s philosophy of anomalous monism as contained in D1-D3 tacitly presupposes the above mentioned principles or postulates such that the former follow ogically from the latter. D1 is a direct result of the P1 insofar as the latter makes the interaction of mental with the physical possible.  If mind and brain are in constant causal interaction it is inevitable that the particular mental events cannot but be physical.  that is, the particular token mental events are identical with the particular token physical events (token-token identity6). D2 makes the further claim based on P1 that the mental events are supervenient on the physical, that is, the mental is dependent on the physical so far as their respective characteristics are concerned. Thus both the identity and the supervenience theses are grafted on the Principle of the Causal Interaction (P1) because it is held that the identity and supervenience relations are derived from the relation of causal  interaction.  If mind and brain influence each other  causally, there is reason to believe that the mental events such as thinking, perceiving, judging, etc. are not only identical with the brain-processes, but are also dependent on them.


II. The Two Levels:  Ontological and Conceptual:


     The anomalous character of the mental contained in D3 follows from the fact that no strict causal laws are available to colate the mental with the physical. That is, as Davidson puts it, “there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained”7.  This further suggests that the mental events are type-different from the physical events and so do not come under the strict causal laws of the physical world.  The supervenience of the mental on the physical and the token-identity of the mental with the physical do not amount to a strict causal determination of the mental.  The mental events remain outside the pale of the deterministic laws for the very  fact that they are mental as type-distinct from the physical.


     The failure of the P2, that is, the Principle of  Nomological Causation in the realm of the mental events shows that anomalous monism is inevitable and that it is true.  It is inevitable because the mental is type-distinct from the physical and it is true because it is the case that the mind has many functions which cannot simply be ascribed to the brain.  Thus anomalism of the mental remains the unchallengeable thesis.
     It is, however, the monistic hypothesis which is subject to doubt as it does not fit in with anomalism of the mental.  This is at least what we can make out of the serious inconsistency allegedly involved in Davidson’s three principles. The P1 and P2 stand for physicalism of some sort while P3 stands for anomalism of the mental.The latter speaks for the autonomy of the mental while the former speak for the determinism of the physical and the identity of the physical with the mental.  Thus there is an inconsistency8 between the P1 and P2 on the one hand and the P3 on the other.  The locus of the inconsistency of monism with anomalism lies in the confusion between two levels of understanding which it implicitly pressupposes, namely the ontological and the conceptual, that is, between the realm of the individual events and the realm of the descriptions of these individuals.


     The two levels are like this: the individual events are the stuff of the world such that the world could be said to be containing such events.  This ontological domain, for Davidson, barbours the individuals of the physical type such that the mental events are identical with them.  Thus the mental events are token-identical with the physical ones and so monism follows as a matter of fact.  Besides the ontological level, there is the level of descriptions of the ontological particulars.   The descriptions of the mental and those of the physical are type-distinct because what the former ascribe to the individual events the latter do not.  That is, while the mental is ascribed such properties as intentionality and subjectivity, the physical realm has very different properties.  Thus there is type-difference between the language of the mind and the language of the physical events and processes.


     Davidson seems to advocate strict monism at the ontological level where the world is physically constituted.  He is well aware of the fact that the so-called mental events have no non-physical existence.  But that is not the whole story.  The mental events enjoy autonomy at another level; they are non-reducibly present alongside the physical events.  This level is the level of conceptual organization and the description of the ontological particulars.  Here manifold discriminations and distinctions are made.  The physical stands apart from the mental and the mental is autonomous in its activities.  The deterministic laws of the physical world do not affect the mental world.


     Now the question is: How can these two levels be reconciled?  Can the apparent inconsistency be removed?  Davidson has a Kantian9 solution to the problem.  He agrees with Kant that natural necessity and autonomy of the mind can go together, that is, the anomaly or freedom of the mind and the causal determinism and the  monism of the  physical can be reconciled. Physicalist monism and the autonomy of the mind can co-exist.


III. Compatibilism and the Autonomy of the Mental:


     Davidson’s Kantian option for compatibilism has the following rationale; it makes room for both physicalist monism and the mental anomalism.  Freedom of the mental runs parallel with the determinism of the physical world.  Nomological necessity of the physical world does not cancel the lawlessness of the mental. Davidson writes:
Mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science; particular  mental can when we know particular identities.  But the explanation of the mental in which we are typically interested relates them to other mental events and conditions.  We explain a man’s free actions, for example, by appeal to his desires, habits, knowledge and perceptions.  Such accounts of intentional behaviour operate in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent10.
     It is thus the “class” of the mental events which need compatibilism determinism as they are to be placed alongside the physical events without being reduced to the latter.  They are autonomous being free  from the physical necessity which characterizes the events in the physical world.  The physical events have no other identity than their nomological behaviour which can be mapped into the strict laws of the physical world.


     Now the idea of the autonomy of the mental follows just from the fact that conscious states of the mind cannot be mapped into the strict laws of the mind or the laws of the psychophysical variety.  The latter especially are not available since consciousness cannot be explained in terms of the physical laws.  The conscious mind is an autonomous reality that needs no nomological explanation.  Davidson puts this as follows:


Even if someone knew the entire physical history of the world, and every mental event were identical with a physical, it would not follow that he could predict or explain a single mental event (so described, of course)11.


     That is to say that the mental events as such remain beyond the physical laws and their power to explain the physical events.  The physical laws are entirely inappropriate so far as the mental realm is concerned.
     The best way of guaranteeing the autonomy of the mental is to harp on the fact that there is anomalousness about the mental.  Davidson therefore argues that there are no psychophysical laws to correlate the mental with the physical. The so-called “bridge laws”  between the mental and the physical are not available so that we cannot explain how the mental events arise out of a physical background.  Anomalousness of the mind arises precisely where the bridge laws fail and this is evident in the fact that the mental events remain beyond the orbit of all strict causal laws.  Davidson remarks:


The anomalism of the mental is thus a necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous12.
And further he says:
We must conclude, I think that nomological slack between the mental and the physical is essential as long as we conceive of man as a rational animal13.


     This makes it clear that the mental is autonomous to the extent it maintains the slack between itself and the physical.  The slack is the gap between the two realms, namely the anomalous mental and the nomological physical.
     This further brings out the issue of reductionism in philosophy of mind.  The autonomy  thesis is dependent on the fact that reduction of the mental into the physical is not possible14. Davidson defends the irreducibility of the mental on the ground  that the mental shows the remarkable features of intentionality which cannot be ascribed to the physical.  The mental can be described in the language of the propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, etc., This is not available for the physical events, so mental activities remain irreducible to the physical.   

                 
     The autonomy thesis, however, does not deny that there is a physical background15 for the mental events or that there is a physical realization16 of the same.  the mental is indifferent to the fact that the physical world provides the backdrop for the emrgence of the mental.


     Davidson argues for the co-existence of the mental and the physical and therefore for their reconciliation within his holistic framework.  His effort is to see that there is a perfect harmony between the physical world and the mind.  The mind is actively engaged in the weaving of the mental world in constant interaction with the  physical world without losing its autonomy. Like Kant, Davidson is a soft determinist so far as the relation of the mental to the physical is concerned.  His defence of weak or soft supervenience of the mental on the physical is a standing testimony to that.


IV.        Strong Vs Weak Supervenience:


     Davidson’s theory of weak supervenience is consistent with his autonomy thesis on the ground that the mental must remain causally linked with the physical even if in a very weak sense.  the mental is dependent on the physical in the sense that it arises in the background of the physical.  This dependence is known as the supervenience of the   mental on the physical.


     Weak supervenience as distinguished from strong supervenience makes room for rough correlation between the mental and the physical.  It shows that though there are no strict psychophysical laws to link the mental with the physical, nevertheless there are weak correlation laws to establish the link between the two. Supervenience is one-directional because it only shows that the mental is dependent on the physical; it remains indifferent to the question whether the physical is dependent on the mental.  Even then there is no guarantee that the mental is rigidly dependent on the physical.  Davidson writes:


Although the position I describe denies there are psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteritics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics.  Such   supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical aspects but differeing in some mental respect, or that an  object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical  respect.  Dependence or supervenience of this kind does not entail  reducibility through law or definition...17.


     That is to say, the mental properties are dependent on the physical properties and so whatever happens in the mental world has its causal basis in the physical world.  Mental properties are directly correlated with physical properties.
     The strong supervenience as advocated by Kim18 clashes with Davidson’s for the reason that the former admits reductionism which Davidson rejects.  Kim argues for the fact that the mental events are strongly correlated with the physical events in the sense that there are psychophysical laws correlating them.  This makes room for nonological  relations between the mental processes and the physical processes in the brain.  This leads to the rejection of Davidson’s P3.  It is not surprising therefore that Kim thoroughly rejects Davidson’s anomalous monism.  Kim writes in a revealing passage:


The fact is that under Davidson’s anomalous monism mentality does no causal work.  Remember: on anomalous monism, events are causes only as they instantiate physical laws, and this means that an event’s mental properties make no causal difference.  And to suppose that altering an event’s mental properties would also alter its physical properties and thereby affect its causal relations is to suppose that psychophysical anomalism, a cardinal tenet of anomalous monism, is false19.


     That is, if Kim is right, Davidson’s auomalous monism makes mind inert and so inefficicacious.  In that case the mental is as good as reduced to the physical.


     This is of course not the case so far as Davidson’s theory is concerned.  In fact Davidson is concerned with the autonomy of the mental and not with the denial of its reality or active presence.  How can an autonomous reality like the mind remain  ineffective or inert vis-a-vis the physical world?  Davidson’s P1 asserts, to the  contrary, that the mind is in interaction with the physical world.  Kim has misrepresented Davidson’s view that mind is dependent on the brain by taking it in the strong sense. The dependence is not strictly nomological.  There is a slack between the two.  If we abolish that slack then Kim’s point is well placed.


     Besides, Davidson’s identity thesis (D1) does not amount to reductionism.  It is a token-token identity which shows that at the ontological level identifying a mental event coincides with the identification of the physical event.  This is constrained by the fact that at the conceptual level there is type-difference between the mental and the physical.  The token-identity thesis as such cannot subvert the thesis of anomalism of the mental.  It is nevertheless a deep inconsistency in Davidson’s theory that there is mental-physical  identity at all.


V. The Inconsistency of AM+P+S:


     The inconsistency arises between avidson’s anomalous monism (AM) and his principles (P) along with thesis of supervenience (S) as pointed out by Kim20 because if the principles are accepted, then anomalousness of the mental does not follow.  Anomalousness of the mental denies that there be nomological causal laws covering all mental and physical events as they are one and the same.  If the principle of identity and the principles of nomologicality are allowed, then the idea of there being no psychophysical laws does not follow.


     We have already seen that supervenince in the weak sense can be consistent with anomalism of the mental but supervenience with identity cannot be consistent with anomalism. Identity in its strongest sense means that the mental and physical events have all the properties in common according to the Leibniz’s law. Therefore under all circumstances the mental and the physical will coincide in all respects as long as the events are properly individuated.  Thus all mental events collapse into the physical events.  This is how the identity theorists21 have conceived the identity relation to be. The type-type identity22 theory advocated by Place and Smart does demand that the  mental processes and the brain processes are factually identical in view of the fact that in the actual world there are no two processes going on: there is one and one type of process taking place in the brain.  These also are called mental as there are no extra-physical properties at all.  According to this view, there is no logical identity between the mental processes and the brain processes because there is no question of identity of meaning between the ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’.


     Davidson has done well to have rejected the type-type identity because it will spell disaster for his anomalous monism in the sense that if the mental and the physical are type-identical then there is no ground for taking the mental as autonomous of the physical.  Even the factual identity between the mental and the physical cannot be allowed as type-identity will lead to the collapse of the anomalism of the mental.  Hence Davidson has opted for the token-token identity of the mental and the physical.  According to this view, only particular mental events are identical with particular physical events.  And this  happens as a matter of fact because our mental history is in reality the history of the physical world.  The types are not identical because in that case they would demand psychophysical  laws which, according to Davidson, are not available at all.  There are only physical laws available.  Type-identity would assimilate the mental events under the covering laws of the physical.  Tokens are, however, identical not because of their type-identity but because of their real stuff involved.  That is, there is an ontological demand that there be only physical stuff in the world.


     But we can very well see that the token-identity also makes anomalousness of the mental impossible.  It is because if the mental is token-identical with the physical, they must have all their properties in common and so they must obey Leibniz’s Law. That is, the tokens will depend on their types for their individuation. The properties especially depend on the types or kinds for their individuation.


     The ontological-conceptual distinction does not ultimately help resolve the inconsistency because token identity leads to type-identity and thus the so-called ontological level is not innocent of the conceptual level.  The ontological identity cannot  easily mesh up with the conceptual difference between the mental and the physical.  If conceptual difference is all that matters for anomalousness, then the ontological monism cannot be espoused along with anomalism.  The monism of the physicalist theory which results from the identity thesis must be discarded if the autonomy of the mind can be accepted.


     Davidson’s monism is the most troublesome thesis in view of the fact that it allows for physicalism or materialism at the ontological level.  It has reduced ontologically, if not conceptually, the mental world to the physical world.  This is the source of inconsistency in Davidson’s system.  If physicalist monism is the end result of metaphysical inquiry into the structure of the world, then mind is found ontologically to be a superfluous phenomenon. Mind is already made into an useless appendix of the world.  If the mental life loses autonomy at the ontological level, what is left of it to be restored at the conceptual level?  In fact the concession of autonomy at the conceptual level is only an empty concession.


     The autonomy principle demands that the mental life has its own reality and that it is not derivatively real in any sense.  In that sense it must be independent of the physical world not only ontologically but also conceptually.  For that it needs to be placed alongside the physical world at both the levels without being reduced to the latter.  It is not denied here that mind is dependent on the physical world for its biological origin23  and therefore a weak form of supervenience could be accommodated.  But this does not amount to a kind of identity even in the sense of token-identity.  All that matters is that the mental is autonomous in the way spelt out by Davidson without being ontologically  identical with the physical.


VI.      Anomalous Dualism Without Cartesianism: The Ontology of the  ‘Thinking Causes’:


     Davidson defends an ontology of ‘thinking causes’24 that are in  active interaction with the physical world.  This amounts to accepting the mental events which cause physical events, that is which bring about causal changes in the world. If  therefore the mental events are causally efficacious and active, they cannot simply remain inert or powerless.  Thus Davidson is right in refuting the charge that his anomalous monism does not render the mental events causally inert25.
     But the question now is: How can the mental causes which are otherwise  active be identical with the physical events that accompany them?  Davidson’s argument is that they are active as the individual events and are themselves physical events in the sense that there is nothing to distinguish between them and the physical events.  The identity thesis is made mandatory for the thesis that the mental events are causally efficacious.  But the fact remains that the mental events are active only as physical events; so the problem remains as to whether the mental events are active at all qua mental events 26.
     Davidson must accept that the mental events are not just a matter of description, though admittedly, according to him, the mental events are introduced only on the level of description27.  If mental events are only descriptionally available, then they lose their autonomy because there is no ontological backing for their autonomy.  Davidson’s main argument is for autonomy and the anomaly of the mental.  But the argument is at stake if we accept the monistic hypothesis that the mental and the physical are identical.
     Davidson has accepted ontological reduction while rejecting conceptual  reduction.  This itself is a major source of inconsistency in the system.  If the mental events are ontologically identical with the physical events, can they remain conceptually different from the latter?  The thin difference between the two levels is that the conceptual level introduces mental predicates which obey no strict laws  either of the mental or the psychophysical type.  By implication it follows that the ontological realm is fully under the strict causal laws.  Thus the mental events are causally determined at one level but are causally not so determined at another level.  Unless the two levels are substantially different, the monism of one level can collapse into the monism of the other level.
     Davidson accepts ontological monism with conceptual dualism.  The latter goes with the irresponsibility of the mental and is the only safeguard for the autonomy of the mental.Thus there is sufficient ground for maintaining dualism between the mental and the physical in Davidson’s theory.  This can very well he called anomalous dualism though it is not identical with Cartesianism. For two reasons it is not Cartesianism; first, it does not allow for substance-dualism in the way Descartess does; second, the ontological monism is still intact.  Davidson cannot for obvious reasons accept dualism at the ontological level because that is Cartesianism of some sort.  Therefore, the only option for him is to accept monism at a great price.
     But one can see that one need not be a Cartesian in order to be a dualist even at the ontological level.  Let us admit that there are mental events which are causally efficacious.  Besides, they are conceptually different from the physical events and so are not under the deterministic laws of the physical world.  Now after admitting all these, can we say that the mental and the physical are identical?  We can admit the two sorts of events ontologically, one sort belonging to the mental realm and the other sort belonging to the physical world.  We need not for this admit, like Descarets, two substances, but we can admit two different realms of reality like Searle who says that the “ontology of the mental is an irreducibly first-person ontology”28.  The dualism of the substances is hard to sustain in the absence of a clear-cut definition of a mental substance or soul, but it is arguably easy to sustain the dualism of the mental and the physical realms.  The latter is what is argued for by the theorists of mental reality as an autonomous reality in this world29.
     The idea of monism is as problematic as the idea of dualism as Scarle has argued because both are allegedly labouring under certain presuppositions which are detrimental to proper study of the mind30.  But it cannot be gainsaid that if we demarcate the reality as mental and physical, we are bound to come to recognize that the mental is different from the physical.Therefore it is dualism which is more commonsensical than monism. Monism is a much laboured doctrine than dualism and so it suffers from all the deficiencies of the reductionist dogma.


VII. Concluding Remarks:


     Davidson’s anomalous monism finds itself in a paradoxical position because of its denial of the mental as an ontological category.  It fails to locate the mind and consciousness in the physical world as full-fledged realities.  It, however, retrieves the ground only partially by conceding that conceptually the mental is real and is autonomous.
     This paper has suggested that the anomalous character of the mind can be better safeguarded in a dualist and mentalist framework.  Davidson’s minimal mentalism can be emphasized to the exclusion of his minimal physicalism or materialism31 such that there could be a genuine effort like Kant’s to place the mental world alongside the physical world.  Davidson’s real Kantian intentions could be better served in keeping the mind forcefully in the domain of the natural world.


REFERENCES
1.  See Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, eds.  Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintikka (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985).  See also Mental Causation, eds. John Heil and Alfred Mele (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993).
2.  See Davidson, “Thinking Causes” in Mental Causation, op.cit., pp. 8-17 for the nature of the allegation and his response.
3.  This notion of minimal materialism is due to J.J.C. Smart, See his “Davidson’s Minimal Materialism” in Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, op.cit., pp. 173-182.
4.  See Davidson, “Mental Events” in Essays on Actions and Events (Clarendon Pres, Oxford, 1980), pp. 207-227.  See also in the same volume his “Psychology as   Philosophy”, pp. 229-244 and “The Material Mind”, pp.245-259.
5.  See Davidson, “Mental Events”, op.cit., pp.207-209.
6.  For a full discussion on token-token identity see Cynthia Macdonald, Mind-Body     Identity Theories (Routledge, London and New York, 1989), Chapter II.
7.  Davidson, “Mental Events” op.cit., p. 208. This is Davidson’s third principle (P3).
8.  Cf. Jaegwon Kim, ‘Can supervenience and ‘Non-Strict Laws’ Save anomalous Mouism?” in Mental Causation, op.cit., pp.19-26.
9.  See Davidson, “Mental Events” for the expression of the Kantian intentions.
10. Davidson, “Mental Events”, op.cit., p.225.
11. Ibid., p.224.
12. Ibid., p.225.
13. Ibid., p.223.
14. Cf. John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (The MIT Press,  Cambridge, Mass., 1994), Chapters 5 and 6.
15. Ibid., Chapter 6.
16. See Hilary Putnam, “Philosophy and Our Mental Life” in Mind, Language and Reality (Philsophical Papers Vol.2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975), pp. 191-303.
17. Davidson, “Mental Events”, op.cit., p.214.
18. Cf. Kim, “Concepts of Supervenience”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.XIV, No.2(1984): 153-176.
19. Quoted by Davidson in his paper “Thinking Causes”, op.cit., pp.5-6.
20. Cf. Kim, “Can Supervenience and ‘Non-Strict Laws’ Save Anomalous Monism?”, op.cit., pp. 19-26.
21. See U.T. Place, “Is Consciousness Brain Process?” in Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Body Identity, ed. John O’ Connor (Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New York, 1969, pp.21-31.  See also in the same volume J.J.C. Smart, “Senasations and Brain      Processes”, pp.32-47.
22. Ibid.
23. See Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, op.cit., and also his Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983) for the    position called “biological naturalism”.
24. See Davidson, “Thinking Causes” op.cit.
25. Ibid.
26. See Kim. “The Non-Reductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation” in Mental Causation, op.cit., pp. 189-210.  See  also his “Can Supervenience and  ‘Non-Srtcit Laws’ Save Anomalous Monism?” op.cit., and F. Sosa “Davidson’s   Thinking Causes” in the same volume. pp. 4-50.
27. Davidson, “Thinking Causes” op.cit., p.8.
28. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, p.95.
29. See ‘Putnam, op.cit., and Searle, op.cit.
30. Searle, op.cit., p.26.
31. Smart, “Davidson’s  Minimal Materialism” op.cit., pp. 173-182. For a refutation of   materialism see Tyler Burge, “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory  Practice” in  Mental Causation, op.cit., pp. 97-120.


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